A Tariff-Tax Reform under Oligopoly and Free Entry by 藤原 憲二 & Kitamura Ryoma
 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
Discussion paper No. 88 
 
 
A Tariff-Tax Reform under Oligopoly and Free Entry  
 
Kenji Fujiwara  
 
School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University 
 
Ryoma Kitamura 
 
Graduate School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University 
 
 
April, 2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 
Nishinomiya 662-8501, Japan 
 
A Tariff-Tax Reform under Oligopoly and Free
Entry∗
Kenji Fujiwara†
School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University
Ryoma Kitamura‡
Graduate School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University
April 27, 2012
Abstract
Constructing a model of oligopoly with free entry, this paper ex-
amines the effects of a tariff reduction accompanied with a unit of
consumption tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and mar-
ket access. We show that the suggested policy reform reduces welfare
while enhancing government revenue and market access by inducing
further excess entry. Some implications of this finding are discussed in
comparison with the case with a fixed number of firms, which involves
a welfare loss and an ambiguous effect on government revenue and
market access.
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1 Introduction
The last half-century has witnessed substantial progresses of trade and finan-
cial liberalization that led to rapid growth of world trade.1 As suggested in
standard trade theory, trade liberalization is beneficial for both an individ-
ual country and the world. Despite such an advocacy of trade liberalization,
a number of developing countries hesitate to liberalize trade for fear of the
expected losses in tariff revenue.2 In order to cope with such tariff revenue
losses, the governments have an incentive to employ or raise a domestic tax,
e.g., a consumption tax and a value-added tax (VAT). Baunsgaad and Keen
(2010, p. 573) find evidence that suggests that ‘many low income countries do
not appear to have easily recouped lost trade tax revenue from domestic tax-
ation, and that this does leave some potential cause for concern. Aizenman
and Jinjarak (2009) also empirically study the impacts of trade liberalization
on government revenue, observing that a switch from trade taxes to domes-
tic taxes has resulted in a net decline in a government revenue-GDP ratio.
Furthermore, Moore and Zanardi (2010, p. 24), addressing a similar issue
from a different perspective, report that ‘developing countries, in the past,
have not altered the pattern of spending as a consequence of falling revenues
from import and export taxes.’
This empirical literature motivates us to consider theoretical implications
of trade liberalization and domestic taxation. The existing literature has
exclusively examined a specific tariff-tax reform that consists of one unit of
tariff reduction and one unit of a consumption tax reform since this reform is
a standard guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. Assuming a perfectly
competitive small open economy, Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen
and Ligthart (2002) establish a novel result that a country gain in both
welfare and government revenue from the above reform. While this win-win
1See, among others, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) for an empirical study reporting the
impacts of tariff reductions on world trade expansion.
2IMF (2005, p. 3) reports that ‘in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, trade taxes ac-
counted, on average, for about one-third of total tax revenue in the early 1980s; now they
account for about one-quarter.
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property of the reform is attractive from both a theoretical and empirical
point of view, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) draw a caution by
proving that the same reform may have an adverse effect on market access,
which is defined by the volume of imports evaluated at the world prices.
Keen and Ligthart (2005) develop a simple duopoly model where a do-
mestic and a foreign firms compete in a domestic market to reexamine the
welfare and revenue effects of two tariff-tax reforms.3 They show that (i)
the policy reform suggested above reduces welfare, and (ii) a tariff reduction
and a consumption tax increase that leave the consumer price unchanged
also reduces welfare.4 While Keen and Ligthart (2005) greatly contribute to
the literature by demonstrating that imperfect competition can reverse the
results under perfect competition, their results deserve further investigations
since they rest on a simplest duopoly model, and lack generality.
This paper considers how general the striking results of Keen and Ligthart
(2005) are. In particular, we pay special attention to the role of free entry into
an oligopolistic industry to address the effects of the point-by-point policy
reform on welfare, government revenue, and market access.5 We prove that
one unit of tariff reduction accompanied by the same unit of consumption
tax increase leaves a country worse off, but enhances government revenue and
market access.6 Although the finding of losses from reform parallels with that
of Keen and Ligthart (2005), the underlying intuition is quite different from
them. In the Keen-Ligthart (2005) model with restricted entry, profit-shifting
abroad gives rise to welfare losses. On the other hand, in our model with free
entry, the policy reform induces excessive entry into the oligopolistic industry,
from which welfare falls.7 Our result could provide another theoretical insight
on the tariff-tax reform, which is worth being tested empirically.
3Naito and Abe (2008) seek a tariff-tax reform that increases both welfare and govern-
ment revenue in a vertically related model of imperfect competition.
4Note that the two reforms are equivalent under perfect competition.
5In Appendix, the case of an arbitrary but fixed number of firms is briefly sketched.
6The point-by-point policy reform will be shown to be equivalent to the (consumer-)
price-neutral reform as in the perfectly competitive case.
7Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) are the seminal works
on the ‘excess entry’ theorem in a free entry oligopoly.
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This paper is planned as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section
3 proves and discusses the main results. Section 4 concludes. The case of
restricted entry is briefly outlined in Appendix only for comparison with the
free entry case.
2 A model
Suppose a market of a country, say Home, in which one Home firm and n ≥ 1
Foreign firms play a Cournot-Nash game. Letting x and yi be an output of
the Home firm and a representative Foreign firm, the inverse demand function
is defined by p (x+
∑n
i=1 yi), with p
′(·) < 0. All firms have the identical cost
cx+f and cyi+f , where c > 0 is a marginal cost, and f > 0 a fixed cost. The
Home government imposes a consumption tax τ ≥ 0, and a specific import
tariff t ≥ 0. Under these assumptions, the profit of the Home firm and a
representative Foreign firm (firm j) is defined as
Home firm :
[
p
(
x+
n∑
i=1
yi
)
− c− τ
]
x− f
Foreign firm :
[
p
(
x+
n∑
i=1
yi
)
− c− τ − t
]
yj − f.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
xp′(x+ ny) + p(x+ ny)− c− τ = 0 (1)
yp′(x+ ny) + p(x+ ny)− c− τ − t = 0, (2)
by assuming a symmetry among n Foreign firms. The second-order conditions
for profit maximization are assumed to be satisfied: xp′′ + 2p′ < 0 and
yp′′ + 2p′ < 0. Moreover, free entry into the oligopolistic industry drives any
Foreign firm’s profit to zero:
[p(x+ ny)− c− τ − t]y − f = 0. (3)
The free entry equilibrium is characterized by the system of (1), (2) and (3),
which contains three endogenous variables x, y and n, given the two tax rates
τ and t.
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Totally differentiating the above system, we have xp
′′ + 2p′ n(xp′′ + p′) y(xp′′ + p′)
yp′′ + p′ nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′ y(yp′′ + p′)
yp′ nyp′ + p− c− τ − t y2p′

 dxdy
dn
 =
 11
y
 dτ +
 01
y
 dt.
As mentioned in Introduction, we focus on a specific tariff-tax reform
suggested by Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002,
2005): one unit of tariff reduction is accompanied by one unit consumption
tax increase. This reform requires that dτ = −dt > 0, and straightforward
manipulations yield the comparative statics outcomes of this reform:
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
=
1
p′
< 0 (4)
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
= 0 (5)
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
= − 1
yp′
> 0. (6)
In other words, the suggested policy reform decreases the Home firm’s out-
put, and increases the number of firms, leaving the Foreign firm’s output
unchanged. These comparative statics results are used in deriving the effects
on welfare, government revenue, and market access.
3 Effects of the policy reform
3.1 Welfare and government revenue
The arguably most important criterion to assess this point-by-point policy
reform is welfare. The Home welfare W consists of consumer surplus CS,
the Home firm’s profit pi, and tax revenue T each of which is defined by
CS =
∫ x+ny
0
p(X)dX − (x+ ny)p(x+ ny) (7)
pi = [p(x+ ny)− c− τ ]x− f (8)
T = τ(x+ ny) + tny, (9)
where x, y and n satisfy (1), (2) and (3). Note that τ(x + ny) denotes
consumption tax revenue, and tny denotes tariff revenue.
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The welfare effects of the point-by-point tariff-tax reform is simply
∂W
∂τ
− ∂W
∂t
=
[
∂CS
∂τ
− ∂CS
∂t
]
+
[
∂pi
∂τ
− ∂pi
∂t
]
+
[
∂T
∂τ
− ∂T
∂t
]
,
each of which is obtained from (7), (8) and (9):
∂CS
∂τ
− ∂CS
∂t
= −(x+ ny)
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+ y
(
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
)]
p′
∂pi
∂τ
− ∂pi
∂t
= −x+
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+ y
(
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
)]
xp′
+(p− c− τ)
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
∂T
∂τ
− ∂T
∂t
= x+ τ
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
+ (τ + t)
[
n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+ y
(
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
)]
.
Substituting (4), (5) and (6) into these, the change in each component is
derived as
∂CS
∂τ
− ∂CS
∂t
= 0 (10)
∂pi
∂τ
− ∂pi
∂t
= −x+ p− c− τ
p′
< 0 (11)
∂T
∂τ
− ∂T
∂t
= x− t
p′
> 0. (12)
Summing up (10), (11) and (12) yields the effect on welfare:
∂W
∂τ
− ∂W
∂t
=
p− c− τ − t
p′
< 0. (13)
From (12) and (13), we have arrived at:
Proposition 1. A tariff reduction accompanied with a consumption tax
increase (point-by-point tariff tax reform) improves government revenue, but
reduces welfare.
(Figure 1 around here)
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The intuitions behind Proposition 1 are considered by using Figure 1 in
which the reaction curves of each firm are depicted. The effects of the point-
by-point reform on the reaction curves are decomposed as follows. First, a
tariff reduction and a consumption tax increase raise the marginal cost of
the Home firm, but have no impact on that of the Foreign firm. Hence, only
the Home firm’s reaction curve shrinks. Under free entry, not only the above
effect but also another effect arises, which is known as a business-stealing
effect in the literature of the ‘excess entry theorem.’8 That is, an increase
in the number of Foreign firms caused by the reform decreases the output
of all firms, and hence the reaction curve of both firms shifts inward. As a
result of these two effects, the post-reform equilibrium becomes N ′ at which
x decreases but y remains unchanged.
Based on these observations, let us look at the intuitions behind Propo-
sition 1. As Eq. (10) tells, the tariff-tax reform has no impact on consumer
surplus because an decrease in x is exactly offset by an increase in ny. Hence,
the sign of the welfare effect is determined by the sign of the effect on the
Home firm’s profit, and the sign of the government revenue effect. The
business-stealing effect naturally reduces the Home firm’s profit. On the
other hand, an increase in n yields a larger government revenue. To know
the reason for this, let us note that the change in government revenue is
decomposed as
dT = τd(x+ ny) + (x+ ny)dτ + td(ny) + nydt
= (x+ ny)dτ + td(ny) + nydt
= xdτ + td(ny),
where the second equation follows the fact that the reform has no effect on
the aggregate consumption, i.e., d(x + ny) = 0, and the last equation uses
dτ = −dt. In view of that dτ > 0 and d(ny) = ydn > 0 from (6), the
increase in n caused by the point-by-point tariff-tax reform necessarily leads
to an revenue increase.
8The term ‘business-stealing effect’ is borrowed from Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
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Proposition 1 claims that since the negative effect on the Home firm’s
profit dominates the positive effect on government revenue, Home loses from
the reform. In other words, the tariff-tax reform expands an inefficiency from
further ‘excess entry’ into the oligopolistic market, and thus necessarily leads
to welfare losses. Note that this reasoning of losses from the tariff-tax reform
is quite different from the reason in the restricted entry case.
Remark. In view of that ∂x/∂τ − ∂x/∂t = 1/p′, ∂y/∂τ − ∂y/∂t = 0,
and ∂n/∂τ − ∂n/∂t = −1/(yp′), the reform of dτ = −dt is equivalent to
the (consumer) price-neutral reform since the reform-induced price change
becomes
∂p
∂τ
− ∂p
∂t
=
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+ y
(
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
)]
p′
=
(
1
p′
− 1
p′
)
p′ = 0.
That is, all of the results in this paper apply not only to the point-by-point
reform but also the price-neutral reform. While this coincidence between
the two reforms is naturally true of perfect competition, the same does not
survive oligopoly with restricted entry. Keen and Ligthart (2005) show that
in a duopoly model, the price-neutral reform as well as the point-by-point
reform reduces welfare.
3.2 Market access
Let us next turn to market access, which is the last criterion to assess the
policy reform. Following Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008, p. 87),
we define market access as ‘the value of imports at world market prices.’
Since p(·) represents a consumer price that the Home consumer faces, the
world price is given by p(·) minus the tariff and consumption tax. Thus,
market access M is defined by
M = [p(x+ ny)− τ − t]ny. (14)
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A change in the consumption tax and tariff affects (14) as follows.
∂M
∂τ
=
[(
∂x
∂τ
+ n
∂y
∂τ
+ y
∂n
∂τ
)
p′ − 1
]
ny + (p− τ − t)
(
n
∂y
∂τ
+ y
∂n
∂τ
)
∂M
∂t
=
[(
∂x
∂t
+ n
∂y
∂t
+ y
∂n
∂t
)
p′ − 1
]
ny + (p− τ − t)
(
n
∂y
∂t
+ y
∂n
∂t
)
.
To look for the effect of the point-by-point reform, let us take a difference
between these terms:
∂M
∂τ
− ∂M
∂t
=
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+ y
(
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
)]
nyp′
+(p− τ − t)
[
n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+ y
(
∂n
∂τ
− ∂n
∂t
)]
. (15)
Substituting (4), (5) and (6) into (15), we obtain
∂M
∂τ
− ∂M
∂t
=
(
1
p′
− 1
p′
)
nyp′ + (p− τ − t)y · −1
yp′
= −p− τ − t
p′
> 0 (16)
which immediately leads to:
Proposition 2. A tariff reduction accompanied with a consumption tax
increase (point-by-point tariff tax reform) improves market access.
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is straightforward. The tariff-tax reform
we have considered has no impact on both p− τ − t and y, while increasing
n. Therefore, the tariff-tax reform unambiguously enhances market access.
What is worth stressing is that the point-by-point tariff-tax reform makes
both p (consumer price) but also p− τ − t (world price) unchanged. In a pio-
neering work, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that the world price and For-
eign welfare are both fixed if the principle of reciprocity of the GATT/WTO
is observed. Relating their argument to our finding, the suggested reform is
a non-beggar-thy-neighborhood policy as well as it improves market access,
and thus Foreign is willing to accept it.
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4 Concluding remarks
We have sought implications of oligopoly with free entry for the welfare,
revenue, and market access effects of a point-by-point tariff tax reform, which
has been frequently guided by the IMF and the World Bank. It is shown that
trade liberalization accompanied by a consumption tax increase necessarily
reduces welfare while it has a positive impact on government revenue and
market access. Our result could complement the seminal work of Keen and
Ligthart (2005) since they use a simplest model of duopoly with restricted
entry.
This paper contributes to the literature in the above sense, but admit-
tedly leaves much unexplored. For instance, we have at this stage no idea
about the robustness of our results in another type of market structure, e.g.,
monopolistic competition in which a variety expansion/contraction plays a
central role for welfare. It is our future research agenda to make further
elaborations along this line of direction.
Appendix: the case of restricted entry
The main text has focused on the case of free entry since our primary pur-
pose is to seek how it affects the effects of a tariff-tax reform on welfare,
government revenue, and market access. However, it makes sense to briefly
look at the case of restricted entry, i.e., an exogenous number of firms, for
comparing the two cases.
What differs between the two cases is that Eq. (3) is missing in the case of
restricted entry: the equilibrium is described by (1) and (2) given n. Totally
differentiating them, we have[
xp′′ + 2p′ n(xp′′ + p′)
yp′′ + p′ nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′
] [
dx
dy
]
=
[
1
1
]
dτ +
[
0
1
]
dt.
Straightforward manipulations allow us to find the output changes associated
with the tariff-tax reform dτ = −dt > 0:
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
=
nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′
∆
,
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
= −yp
′′ + p′
∆
(17)
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where ∆ = [(x+ ny)p′′ + (n+ 2)p′]p′ > 0.
Making use of these results, let us first examine the government revenue
effect. Using (9) and (17), we obtain
∂T
∂τ
− ∂T
∂t
= x+ τ
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
+ n(τ + t)
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
= x+
τ [nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′]
∆
− n(τ + 1)(yp
′′ + p′)
∆
= x+
τp′ − nt(yp′′ + p′)
∆
, (18)
which is just an n-firm extension of Eq. (10) in Keen and Ligthart (2005, p.
388).
The change in consumer surplus, and the Home firm’s profit is
∂CS
∂τ
− ∂CS
∂t
= −(x+ ny)
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)]
p′ (19)
∂pi
∂τ
− ∂pi
∂t
= −x+
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ n
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)]
xp′
+(p− c− τ)
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
. (20)
Therefore, aggregating (18), (19), and (20), the welfare effect is derived as
∂W
∂τ
− ∂W
∂t
= (p− c− nyp′)
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
+ n(τ + t− nyp′)
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
=
(p− c− nyp′)[nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′]− n(τ + t− nyp′)(yp′′ + p′)
∆
=
(p− c− nyp′)[nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′]− n(yp′ + p− c− nyp′)(yp′′ + p′)
∆
=
[p− c− ny(yp′′ + 2p′)]p′
∆
< 0, (21)
where the third equation uses the first-order condition of a Foreign firm,
yp′ + p − c − τ − t = 0, and the negativity of (21) follows from the second-
order condition of a Foreign firm, yp′′ + 2p′ < 0.
The above findings on the welfare and government revenue effects of the
reform are just a rehabilitation of Keen and Ligthart’s (2005) results in an
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n-firm model. The point-by-point policy reform necessarily reduces welfare,
but can increase government revenue if τ is small enough.
The market access effect is computed as follows. Differentiating (14) with
respect to τ and t, and taking a difference, we have
∂M
∂τ
− ∂M
∂t
= n
[(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
yp′ + (nyp′ + p− τ − t)
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)]
=
n {[nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′]yp′ − (nyp′ + p− τ − t)(yp′′ + p′)}
∆
=
n {[nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′]yp′ − (nyp′ + p− yp′ − p+ c)(yp′′ + p′)}
∆
=
n[(yp′′ + 2p′)yp′ − c(yp′′ + p′)]
∆
, (22)
where the third equation again uses the relationship τ + t = yp′ + p − c.
The sign of (22) is strictly positive if yp′′ + p′ > 0, which is a necessary and
sufficient condition for ∂y/∂τ − ∂y/∂t > 0, namely, profit-shifting occurs. In
the Keen-Ligthart model with linear demand, (22) is necessarily positive.
Finally, let us address the effect on Foreign welfare which equals the
aggregate profit of the Foreign firms. Letting pi∗ ≡ [p(n+ny)−c−τ− t]y−f
be the profit of each Foreign firm, it is obtained as follows.
∂(npi∗)
∂τ
− ∂(npi
∗)
∂t
=
[
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
+ (n− 1)
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)]
nyp′
=
[
nyp′′ + (n+ 1)p′
∆
− (n− 1)(yp
′′ + p′)
]
nyp′ (23)
=
(yp′′ + 2p′)nyp′
∆
> 0
where (23) uses (17), and the positivity in the right-hand side comes from the
second-order condition for the Foreign firm’s profit maximization: yp′′+2p′ <
0. Thus, the tariff-tax reform unambiguously increases Foreign welfare. To
summarize the results in the restricted entry case, we can claim:
Proposition 3 (Generalization of Keen and Ligthart, 2005). In the
case of restricted entry, A tariff reduction accompanied with a consumption
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tax increase (point-by-point tariff tax reform) (i) unambiguously reduces wel-
fare, (ii) enhances government revenue if τ is small enough, (iii) improves
market access if yp′′ + p′ < 0 (profit-shifting occurs), and (iv) improves For-
eign welfare.
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